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BOOK REVIEWS
By Paul A. Freund.1 Boston:
Little, Brown & Company, 1949. Pp. 130. $3.00

ON UNDERSTANDING

THE SUPREME COURT.

This little book can be read with pleasure and with profit; and 1 hope it
will be read by a host of people. It comprises in three chapters the text of
the Rosenthal Foundation lectures delivered by Professor Paul Freund at the
Law School of Northwestern University, together with the subsequently added
Introduction and Notes.
That there is need for understanding the Supreme Court, I suppose most
everybody would agree. That Professor Freund is exceptionally qualified
to lead one towards that goal, I can enthusiastically affirm. He speaks with
first-hand knowledge. He has seen the Court in operation from the chambers
of a Justice (as clerk to Justice Brandeis), from the table of counsel and advocate (as assistant on the staff of the Solicitor General), and from the
relatively detached post of teacher (as a member of the Faculty of Law at
Harvard). He makes no pretension of furnishing all the answers: he is
content to indicate that judgments about the Court are more difficult to reach
than might be supposed, and to suggest inquiries relevant in reaching judgments of one's own. While he is not concerned solely with the work of the
Court in constitutional cases, what he has to say, especially in the third chapter,
is so much to the point in that area of the law that I shall comment mainly on it.
In this chapter, happily styled "'Judge and Company' in Constitutional
Law," Professor Freund breaks away from the more or less traditional
style of writing about the substantive content of the Court's opinions and the
ways of the justices. Instead, he enlarges upon and emphasizes the role
played by lawyers (as part of the "Company") in the determination of constitutional issues. He makes it clear that one of the best first steps towards
understanding what the Supreme Court has done in any given case is to
find out what the lawyers themselves did beforehand. After all, it is the
lawyers who raise the questions and bring them, via the lower courts (also
included in the "Company") to the Supreme Court; and in a large sense the
task of that Court from then on is to dispose of what they proposed.
The lawyer's part is discussed and illustrated by Professor Freund in
three aspects: "The what, the how, and the when of constitutional litigation."
On the what, he shows the large responsibility of counsel in supplying the
materials upon which the courts may draw in making their decisions. The
long since famous Brandeis brief in the Oregon case on hours for women is
put down as "probably the most notable contribution to the lawyer's technique
1. Professor of Law, Harvard University.
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in constitutional cases." But he does not leave it there: he points up a number of problems which the brief raises-e.g., whether economic data should
not be developed at trial and embodied in the record, rather than presented in a
brief. On the how, he sees the role of counsel as even more striking; indeed,
the determination is largely in counsel's hands whether the case shall be an allout contest on the constitutional front or only an engagement limited to a
small sector. The Tennessee Valley Authority litigation supplies, almost as
if made to order, an illustration of the clash of the broad and narrow views
of constitutional warfare; and the holding company litigation is described
as a still more vivid instance of jockeying for position. Shading off from the
how into the when, Professor Freund considers the "critical importance" of
the timing of constitutional lawsuits. Here he finds large questions of policy
arising that concern the Court, the Government and the public. Not the least
of these is the policy of the Court itself in determining when and in what
circumstances it will exercise its function of passing upon constitutional
questions.
Professor Freund concludes his discussion by noting two shifts which
are taking place in respect of 'the forum for the consideration of constitutional issues and which bear significantly on the lawyer's work of the
future. The first is that, given the Supreme Court's recent reluctance to
declare state laws unconstitutional under the due process clause unless basic
civil liberties are involved, constitutional litigation over state laws tends to be
concentrated more and more in state courts under state constitutional provisions. State constitutional law may thus become of "dominant" importance,
demanding more attention than is commonly given to it. The second is that,
with the increasing diversion of constitutional issues of federal legislation
from the courts to the legislative stage, the constitutional lawyer's function is
being discharged more and more before Congressional committees. Federal
constitutional law may thus in part become "one phase of legislative drafting," with increased emphasis on the constructive side of the lawyer's job.
In limiting these comments to chapter 3, I do not mean to minimize
the other two. Chapter 1, "Concord and Discord," tells a good part of the
story of judicial "lawmaking," particularly as to the play of policy considerations in the hierarchy of values set up by the Court under due process-e.g.,
in cases affecting 'freedom of the mind on the one hand, and cases touching
property interests on the other. The process of constitutional decision is seen
as having become "more self-conscious, more avowedly an expression of
political philosophy, than ever before." Chapter 2, "Portrait of. a Liberal
Judge: Mr. justice Brandeis," is truly that, and excellently done.
NoEL T. DOWLING*
*Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University.
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COURTS ON TRIAL. By Jerome N. Frank.' Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1949. Pp. vii, 441. $5.00.
As when you read a fine novel, you know that the big feeling you get from
this book is more important that its individual ideas, organization and syntax.
You know,*but maybe you don't think a book about law has any business
making you feel.
But you just can't ignore the big feeling you get when you finish "Courts
on Trial." It's too strong! You feel that the quest for uniformity and predictability of decision that has become the quest for law is shamefully wrong.
You wonder what is so right about a uniform string of unfair decisions or an
accurate prediction of a wrong decision? And what is more wrong than the
oft-heard sop: "The accused is innocent under standards of justice, but
guilty under the law." And you know that each case is an individual state
of facts different from all others and that what we should really look for
is justice in individual cases. You do not worry about the indefinability of
the word "justice"; for you know that justice is one of those things which
we nearly always recognize but can never put into words-as the colors
the artist paints or the sounds a musician makes. But then you realize that
justice in an individual case is a gamble when the court does not have before
it all the facts and that rarely can a court ever have before it all the facts.
Which gets us down to the explicit theme of Judge Frank's book: That
courthouse fact-finding has more in common with dice-throwing than science
and always will have; and that this affinity forever dooms law itself to a
status closer to dice-throwing than to science.
Responsible for the truism that courthouse fact-finding can never be a
science is this: What is found as a fact has always been through two subjective
reactions. First, the reaction of the witness to the occurrence and, second, the
reaction of the trier of fact to the personality of the witness. Even the
reaction of an honest witness to an occurrence usually differs substantially
from what actually occurred. For example, defective sight or hearing, low
attention level, bad memory or subconscious prejudice may warp the witness'
reaction to the occurrence beyond any resemblance to the occurrence itself.
Then the trier of fact must react to the witness' version of the occurrence. The
witness' accent, way of looking out of his eyes, sniffle or any one of thousands
of other personality quirks may so charm or revolt the fact-triers that they
believe or disbelieve the witness on the basis of a personality quirk which may
or may not have real bearing on credibility. These obstructions to the actual
facts will always be there, thinks Judge Frank, so long as two or more witnesses
continue to mount the stand and give conflicting versions of the same facts.
1. Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
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The outcome of a particular case, therefore, cannot now and never can
be accurately predicted. And without predictability, of course, no legal
science is possible. But today's explorers for a legal science, says Judge
Frank, make another fallacious assumption in addition to assuming that
some day legal decisions can be made one hundred percent predictable. And
that is that legal decisions can be made more predictable by systems based only
on appellate court law.
To prove his point, Judge Frank sets out abstracts of the various systems
such as "legal realism," which law professors have so far devised to increase
predictability. (These masterful little synopses of the philosophy of the "legal
realists," the "anthropological cult." the "natural law cult," are a short-cut
to an education in legal philosophy and themselves are worth the price of the
book.) He, then, points out wherein each one has utterly and completely
failed to achieve its objective.
The explorers for a legal science would come closer to their objective,
thinks Judge Frank, were they to devote their energies to the fact-finding
process. Although fact-finding can never be one-hundred percent accurate,
says Judge Frank, it can be vastly more accurate than it is today.
And here Judge Frank begins to lash present-day fact-finding institutions.
The jury system takes the worst whipping. Judge Frank says that juries
don't usually understand the law and, if so, as often as not, ignore it for their
own reasons. I take it from other parts of Judge Frank's book that this
wouldn't be so bad if the jurors conscientiously attempted to give justice. But
Judge Frank doesn't think they do. He thinks jurors flip coins for decisions,
will change their minds about a decision just to go home, etc. And worst
of all, according to Judge Frank, jurors can hide a bad decision behind the
general verdict in which all they have to say is "We find for plaintiff in
amount of so many dollars." No one can tell whether or not the jurors
actually found true a version of the facts which would justify a decision
for the plaintiff under the judge's charge on the law. I suspect this secrecy
is the crux of Judge Frank's quarrel with the jury system. For there are
oldtime salesmen in Sing-Sing who' will tell you that they learned the hard
way when Judge Frank was Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission that judge Frank has a passion for full disclosure. Certainly, this
passion for full disclosure must be the mainspring of Judge Frank's criticism
of juries because he admits that judges and jurors reach decisions in the
same manner. Judge Frank subscribes to the Gestalt psychology theory that
any decision results from a general impression created by the whole conglomeration of facts and law presented; not from the precise measurement of
the facts against the law. The difference between the juror and judge is that
the juror just announces his Gestalt, while the judge has his Gestalt, then
must look through the record and justify his decision with facts that have
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been presented to the court but which he does not necessarily have to believe.
The necessity to find those {acts, thinks Judge Frank, keeps judges from
reaching some of the more outrageous decisions reached by juries. This
statement, however, seems open to challenge. For Judge Frank admits that
a judge, to justify his Gestalt often finds facts he does not believe; and Judge
Frank admits that the jury's decision, to stand, must also rest on facts presented. On Judge Frank's reasoning, then, wherein is the jury's decisional
process more outrageous than a judge's. Morally, at least, the jury is better
off since it does not have to lie while in a sense the judge does. Personally,
I think that Judge Frank is too hard on both juries and trial court judges.
Judge Frank also lays into the advocate system and its "fight" or "letthe-most-skillful-man-prevail" theory. Judge Frank suggests that the system favors wealthier clients, that it terrifies witnesses into forgetting the
truth and that it has other bad features. I won't comment on these criticisms,
because I'm prejudiced. Without the advocate system, I don't see how I could
engage in the private practice of law. And I love the private practice of
law. Also socked pretty hard by Judge Frank are the exclusionary rules of
evidence. According to Judge Frank, we only have them because
juries are stupid; and the rules keep out of a trial whole classes of evidence
which are not in themselves reliable but are when joined with other evidence.
The book includes a chapter or two on legal education and concludes that the
law schools waste too much time with the case system.
For all these defects Judge Frank finds in our present day fact-finding
institutions, he suggests rough outlines of proposed curative measures.
Among other things, he believes that juries should be made to give
special or fact verdicts in which the judge would ask specific questions about
the facts which would require specific answers 'from the jury. The judge
would then apply the law to the facts as found by the jury. He also recommends
that an agency be set up to provide funds to those litigants who need money
to collect evidence; that the exclusionary rules be liberalized, and many other
tentative proposals designed to improve fact-finding and legal education. One's
experience would have to be broader than mine effectively to evaluate these
proposals.
All of these proposals-indeed, the whole book-are written down in
an easy, readable style. Unlike the ordinary lawyer, Judge Frank does not
force to push facts into artificial categories and make consistent what is not
consistent. This gives his writing an imaginative sweep and sprightliness
that is refreshing. But it does get in the way of his theme.
The two worst faults of Judge Frank's style are self-citation and exaggeration to make a point. But the book does apologize for the selfcitation. And, reasoning from Judge Frank's opinion of juries, his apology
for the exaggeration would probably be that he is writing for laymen and that
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laymen might not understand a naked point. Still another flaw of Judge
Frank's style is a penchant to set up straw men and then huff and puff at them
at length. But I suppose Judge Frank would probably think this, too, necessary for the lawyer talking to the laymen.
All in all, the book is a fascinating product of a mind as brilliant and as
versatilely learned as any mind in America today.
HUGo L. BLACK, JR.*

HUGo L. BLACK: A STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCEsS. By Charlotte Williams.'

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. Pp. vii, 208. $3.50.
This is a penetrating study of the career of Hugo L. Black, Roosevelt's
first appointee to the Supreme Court, and an attempt, in his judicial record,
to trace the retreat of the court from its traditional role of opposition to the
expansion of governmental power.
While the main emphasis of the book is placed upon the period since
Black ascended to the bench, the author treats her subject's career in its entirety, from his birth in one of the poorer Alabama counties through his years
as police judge of Birmingham, prosecuting attorney of Jefferson County,
successful lawyer at the Birmingham bar, and United States Senator. In this
connection it is proper to say that, contrary to popular opinion, he attained
considerable eminence as an attorney in Birmingham after World War I.
In her discussion of Black's origins and the years in which he embarked
on his career, she is able to throw considerable light upon the forces that made
him what he is-the protagonist of the underdog, the champion of the little
man, and the spokesman for civil, political, and religious liberties.
In 1926 Black was elected to fill the seat in the Senate made vacant by
the retirement of Oscar Underwood. Entering upon his duties in 1927, he,
with his brilliant forensic and dialectic abilities, became a gadfly to the Republican majority. With the breaking of the great depression he advocated
the thirty-hour week as a cure for technological unemployment, thus solidifying his support by organized labor, and with the coming of the Roosevelt administration he devoted himself assidously to the cause of social security.
In 1933 he prosecuted his fight upon the United States Shipping Board,
at the same time introducing a resolution authorizing an investigation cf the
government's methods of awarding mail-carrying contracts. As a result
of the latter investigation, Postmaster Walter F. Brown of the preceding
administration was more seriously compromised than any high federal official
*Member, Birmingham, Alabama, Bar.
1. Associate Professor of Social Science, Middle Tennessee State College, Murfreesboro, Tennessee.
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had been since the Teapot Dome affair. In the summer of 1935 Senator
Black introduced a resolution calling for an investigation of the lobbying
activities of the utility companies. The methods of the Senate committee,
which he headed, were criticized, but it was soon apparent that it had unearthed a rich store of carefully concealed fact. It is significant that in 1937
he was one of the strongest supporters of Roosevelt's plan to enlarge the
Supreme Court.
In October, 1937, Black's appointment to the highest court in the land
was confirmed. It must be said that in allowing his friends to state to the
Senate without contradiction that he had never been a member of the Ku
Klux Klan, and in never admitting the fact until after confirmation, he was
something less than frank and gave reasonable grounds for doubts touclhig
his personal integrity. It is a happy circumstance that these justifiable fears
have not been realized. Upon taking his seat he immediately struck out
alone, sometimes in directions that not even the most liberal of the old justices
had hitherto suggested. Miss Williams gives detailed and illuminating
analyses of the more important cases in which he wrote the majority opinion
for the Court and of many of his dissents.
Competent critics were not long in realizing that Black's legal learning,
his ability, and his capacity for growth, were consistently above what had
been expected. One is impressed with the sincerity of his concern with
social improvement and human betterment, and by his rooted faith that these
ends can best be accomplished by an active government. Ile has been, indeed,
the "little man's" advocate upon the Court, and this attitude, as Miss Williams
points out, is not confined "to the poor nor to the oppressed by the operation
of major social and political forces, but stretches far enough to include all
who for any reason are hard put to maintain their rights in an unequal
conflict." In this category fall the enemies of society, caught and held helpless
in the machinery of avenging justice. Black is ever alert to see that in their
trial and conviction the latter are afforded the constitutional safeguards of a
fair trial and protection from personal abuse.
In cases involving the question of religious freedom, Miss Williams
shows that Justice Black had usually been in favor of the complaining litigant
in cases in which the state is charged with restricting religious practices, but
in those involving the question of government subsidy to some particular sect
-notably in Everson v. Board of Education2 -his course has not been so consistent.
Almost from the time that it began to take shape, the Roosevelt Court
was distinguished by an unprecedented number of non-unanimous opinions,
though it may be maintained with considerable justice that there was unanimity
in seeking a particular end while disputing the means of reaching it.
2. 330 U.S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711, 168 A.L.R. 1392 (1947).
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Miss Williams gives a fascinating account of factions in the Court,
with Black leading one group and Frankfurter, supported by Jackson, the
other. It was Justice Jackson, as she points out, who finally dragged out into
the open the proof that the fire of factionalism existed behind the smoke of
rumor. On the occasion of the filling of the vacancy of Chief Justice on the
death of Stone in 1946, Jackson, in an unprecedented attack upon Black, pulled
back the curtain and exposed the ugly situation with which the Court was
beset. This indiscretion probably sprang ifrom Jackson's deep disappointment
over Vinson's appointment, and his conviction that his own elevation was
blocked by Black's alleged threat to resign if he were appointed. However
one may evaluate Jackson's charges, it is to the credit of Black's good sense
and self-control that he made no reply.
In summing up her conclusions, Miss Williams finds that Justice Black's
career warrants the assertion that the origin of his political philosophy lies
in his desire to improve the lot of the common man and to protect him from
the oppression of powerful forces. Rejecting completely the thesis that that
government governs best which governs least, he would employ the instruments of society to effect far reaching social and economic reforms. It is
pointed out, however, that when he feels that government is acting in such a
way as to deny some individual one of his rights or liberties, he strikes at it
vigorously, and he has been particularly zealous in protecting the freedoms
of speech, press, and radio. Further, he has small compunction about departing
from judicial precedent, and he believes that when a rule is found to be "inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare," it should be
immediately and frankly altered.
As Mr. Roosevelt's first appointee to the Supreme Court, taking his seat
under peculiarly trying circumstances, Black's record was immediately subjected to the closest and most critical scrutiny. At first atacked for his previous
membership in the Klan, distrusted by racial, religious, and minority groups
on the same grounds, and feared by business and financial interests for his
support of New Deal legislation in the Senate, Black is now commonly regarded as an unusually fair and capable judge.
Miss Williams has succeeded brilliantly in evoking the atmosphere of
the early days of the New Deal. Further, she has written a penetrating and
scholarly study which holds a peculiar interest for one who has lived through
the period discussed, and observed the development of a new epoch in the
history of the Court when previous positions have been frequently and drastically reversed.
GEORGE H. CATE, SR.*
*Member, Cate & Cate, Nashville, Tennessee.
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HATCH ACT DECISIONS (POLITICAL ACTIVITY CASES) oF THE UNITED
STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. By James W. Irwin.' Washington:

United States Government Printing Office, 1949. Pp. 304. $1.50.
The primary purpose of this book is to make available to attorneys for
persons charged with violations of the political activity provisions of the
Hatch Act the precedents and information needed in preparing a defense.
To accomplish this purpose the editor presents 59 pages of text and excerpts
from 51 "representative" decisions of the United States Civil Service Commission, which enforces the statute.
This book is timely in view of the likelihood that increasing numbers of
people will be affected by the Hatch Act prohibitions. There may be some
doubt, however, as to the extent to which the book fills its objective. The editor
states that the selected decisions "reasonably comprehend the principles of
law with which the Commission has dealt in the field of prohibited political
activity." (p. 8) If the reference is to procedural principles doubtless the
editor's claim is justified, but it is doubtful whether all kinds of prohibited
political activity that have been considered by the Commission are illustrated
in the selected decisions.
This criticism may spring from a conviction that the book should be
helpful to those interested in avoiding participating in the prohibited political
activity as well as those trying to defend past conduct. After careful study
of the book one can hardly be confident in his knowledge of the conduct that
constitutes prohibited political activity.
Perhaps it is not fair to wish that the editor had done what he did not
undertake to do, but he fails to develop several suggested points. We are told
that "when other Commissioners are unavailable, one may render a decision."
(p. 65) We are not informed of the basis for this rule, but the implications
are startling in view of the possible consequences of "Commission" decisions.
Readers would like to know more about the Commission's internal procedure
in handling political activity cases. Such information might not be directly
relevant to the purpose of the book, but the editor makes reference (pp.
37, 88) to problems in administering the statute.
The editor has made available to attorneys and other interested persons
materials not otherwise readily available. The discussion in the text of the
Commission's procedure in political activity cases (pp. 28-38) is informative
and will dispel fears of attorneys who are unaccustomed to appearing before
the Commission. The selected cases provide precedents that in the absence
of this book the practicing attorney could collect only with great difficulty.
The objective of the.book would be better served had more complete
references to cases and other materials been given. Indeed, readers are not
1. Chief Hearing Examiner, United States Civil Service Commission.

